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TShark - TryHackMe

#challenge #ctf #tryhackme #security

This is a quick writeup of the TShark room of tryhackme.com.

TShark

TShark is a network protocol analyzer. It lets you capture packet data from a live network, or read packets from a previously saved capture file, either printing a decoded form of those packets to the standard output or writing the packets to a file.

Reading PCAP Files

TShark will display and number the packets. We can also use wc -l to count them:

$ tshark -r dns.cap
    1   0.000000 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 70 Standard query 0x1032 TXT google.com
    2   0.000530 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 98 Standard query response 0x1032 TXT google.com TXT
    3   4.005222 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 70 Standard query 0xf76f MX google.com
    4   4.837355 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 298 Standard query response 0xf76f MX google.com MX 40 smtp4.google.com MX 10 smtp5.google.com MX 10 smtp6.google.com MX 10 smtp1.google.com MX 10 smtp2.google.com MX 40 smtp3.google.com A 216.239.37.26 A 64.233.167.25 A 66.102.9.25 A 216.239.57.25 A 216.239.37.25 A 216.239.57.26
    5  12.817185 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 70 Standard query 0x49a1 LOC google.com
    6  12.956209 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 70 Standard query response 0x49a1 LOC google.com
    7  20.824827 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 85 Standard query 0x9bbb PTR 104.9.192.66.in-addr.arpa
    8  20.825333 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 129 Standard query response 0x9bbb PTR 104.9.192.66.in-addr.arpa PTR 66-192-9-104.gen.twtelecom.net
    9  92.189905 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 74 Standard query 0x75c0 A www.netbsd.org
   10  92.238816 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 90 Standard query response 0x75c0 A www.netbsd.org A 204.152.190.12
   11 108.965135 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 74 Standard query 0xf0d4 AAAA www.netbsd.org
   12 109.202803 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 102 Standard query response 0xf0d4 AAAA www.netbsd.org AAAA 2001:4f8:4:7:2e0:81ff:fe52:9a6b
   13 169.027394 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 74 Standard query 0x7f39 AAAA www.netbsd.org
   14 169.027781 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 102 Standard query response 0x7f39 AAAA www.netbsd.org AAAA 2001:4f8:4:7:2e0:81ff:fe52:9a6b
   15 178.239844 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 74 Standard query 0x8db3 AAAA www.google.com
   16 178.256382 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 94 Standard query response 0x8db3 AAAA www.google.com CNAME www.l.google.com
   17 187.853816 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 76 Standard query 0xdca2 AAAA www.l.google.com
   18 187.870481 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 76 Standard query response 0xdca2 AAAA www.l.google.com
   19 228.708302 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 75 Standard query 0xbc1f AAAA www.example.com
   20 228.941445 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 75 Standard query response 0xbc1f AAAA www.example.com
   21 240.323938 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 79 Standard query 0x266d AAAA www.example.notginh
   22 240.536930 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 79 Standard query response 0x266d No such name AAAA www.example.notginh
   23 271.164734 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 71 Standard query 0xfee3 ANY www.isc.org
   24 271.237338 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 115 Standard query response 0xfee3 ANY www.isc.org AAAA 2001:4f8:0:2::d A 204.152.184.88
   25 271.241158 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 82 Standard query 0x5a53 PTR 1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa
   26 271.241746 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 105 Standard query response 0x5a53 PTR 1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa PTR localhost
   27 271.244120 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 67 Standard query 0x208a NS isc.org
   28 271.259884 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 129 Standard query 0x326e SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   29 271.262407 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 166 Standard query response 0x208a NS isc.org NS ns-ext.nrt1.isc.org NS ns-ext.sth1.isc.org NS ns-ext.isc.org NS ns-ext.lga1.isc.org
   30 271.279695  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 129 Standard query response 0x326e No such name SRV _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   31 271.280350 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 98 Standard query 0xf161 SRV _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   32 271.297651  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 98 Standard query response 0xf161 No such name SRV _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   33 271.298194 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 140 Standard query 0x8361 SRV _ldap._tcp.05b5292b-34b8-4fb7-85a3-8beef5fd2069.domains._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   34 271.317878  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 140 Standard query response 0x8361 No such name SRV _ldap._tcp.05b5292b-34b8-4fb7-85a3-8beef5fd2069.domains._msdcs.utelsystems.local
   35 271.419659 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 83 Standard query 0xd060 A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   36 271.436583  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 83 Standard query response 0xd060 No such name A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   37 278.861300 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 83 Standard query 0x7663 A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   38 278.879313  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 83 Standard query response 0x7663 No such name A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
$ tshark -r dns.cap | wc -l
38
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TShark allows us to use "display filters" the same way as in Wireshark. Here, we filter DNS queries:

$ tshark -r dns.cap -Y "dns.qry.type == 1"
   9  92.189905 192.168.170.8 → 192.168.170.20 DNS 74 Standard query 0x75c0 A www.netbsd.org
   10  92.238816 192.168.170.20 → 192.168.170.8 DNS 90 Standard query response 0x75c0 A www.netbsd.org A 204.152.190.12
   35 271.419659 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 83 Standard query 0xd060 A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   36 271.436583  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 83 Standard query response 0xd060 No such name A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   37 278.861300 192.168.170.56 → 217.13.4.24  DNS 83 Standard query 0x7663 A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
   38 278.879313  217.13.4.24 → 192.168.170.56 DNS 83 Standard query response 0x7663 No such name A GRIMM.utelsystems.local
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We can also filter the packet structure. Here we extract only the DNS name field:

$ tshark -r dns.cap -Y "dns.qry.type == 1" -T fields -e dns.qry.name
www.netbsd.org
www.netbsd.org
GRIMM.utelsystems.local
GRIMM.utelsystems.local
GRIMM.utelsystems.local
GRIMM.utelsystems.local
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DNS Exfiltration

Let's examine the pcap provided.

$ tshark -r pcap | wc -l
125
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We have 125 packets.

$ tshark -r pcap -Y "dns.flags.response == 0" | wc -l 
56
$ tshark -r pcap -T fields -e dns.qry.name | uniq | wc -l 
56
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There are 56 unique DNS queries.

Now if we look at some packets, we notice a strange 0xbeef transaction ID. It may be used on DNS server side to identify 'special' queries:

$ tshark -r pcap | head -n2
    1   0.000000  192.168.1.8 → 192.168.1.200 DNS 74 Standard query 0xbeef A M.m4lwhere.org
    2   0.019731 192.168.1.200 → 192.168.1.8  DNS 90 Standard query response 0xbeef A M.m4lwhere.org A 52.207.163.69
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One thing differs in the 125 packets: the subdomain! It may be used to exfiltrate data. Let's find this out:

$ tshark -r pcap -Y "dns.flags.response == 0" -T fields -e "dns.qry.name" | sed "s/.m4lwhere.org//g" | tr -d "\n"
MZWGCZ33OMYHE4SZL5RDA6L2L5EV65RTL5TDC3BTOJSUIXZXNA2HI7IK
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To auto-magically decode the exfiltered data, I rely on Ciphey

$ python3 -m ciphey -t "MZWGCZ33OMYHE4SZL5RDA6L2L5EV65RTL5TDC3BTOJSUIXZXNA2HI7IK"
Result 'flag{th1s_is_t0ugh_with0u7_tsh4rk!}' (y/N): y
Checker: passed with regex re.compile('(?i)(htb|thm|flag|ctf)\\{.*\\}', re.IGNORECASE)
Format used:
  base32
  utf8
Final result: "flag{s0rrY_b0yz_I_v3_f1l3reD_7h4t}"
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